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Allen Buchanan
The Open-ended Normativity of the Ethical
Abstract: In The Ethical Project, Kitcher has three main aim: (1) to provide a natu-
ralistic explanation of the rise of morality and of its subsequent development, (2) to
supply an account of moral progress that explains progressive developments that have
occurred so far and shows how further progress is possible, and (3) to propose a fur-
ther progressive developmentthe emergence of a cosmopolitan moralityand make
the case that it is a natural extension of the ethical project. I argue that Kitcher does
not succeed in achieving any of these aims and that he cannot do so given the meager
resources of his explanatory model. The chief difficulty is that Kitcher equivocates in
his characterization of the original (and still supposedly primary) function of ethics.
Although he begins by characterizing it as (a) remedying altruism failures in order to
avoid their social costs, he sometimes characterizes it instead as (b) remedying altruism
failures simpliciter. Kitcher does not explain how a practice whose original function
was (a) developed into one whose function is (b). Further, it appears that he cannot
do so without significantly enriching his explanatory model to include a more robust
account of how humans came to have the capacity to reflect on and revise norms.
1. Introduction
The Ethical Project is an admirable intellectual achievement and at the same
time a masterful exhibition of skill in communication. Kitcher realizes the idea
of a public intellectual: He is able to present complex ideas and arguments to a
broad audience and to do so without loss of accuracy or rigor. In what follows
I will be critical of The Ethical Project, but I am convinced that this book
will stimulate fruitful discussion and set a high standard for future efforts to
understand morality.
Kitcher's aims in The Ethical Project are admirablyindeed, breathtaking-
lyambitious. First, he seeks to provide an historical explanation of what moral-
ity is and of how it has developed over time. Second, he aims to supply an
account of moral progress that will provide a principled basis both for our as-
sumptions about which changes in the past have been progressive and for the
belief that further progress is possible. Third, he tries to use his account of
morality and moral progress to ground a proposal for a new progressive develop-
ment, the creation of a genuinely cosmopolitan morality. I shall argue that none
of these three goals is achieved and that none of them can be achieved, given
the limited resources that Kitcher provides for understanding morality.
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2. The Historical Account of Morality and Its
Development
The potential value in Kitcher's historical approach to explaining morality de-
rives from the strategy of explaining how humans could have engaged in some
pre-ethical activity that gave rise to ethics. In other words, his history must
begin with something non-moral to explain morality, for if he began with an
activity that is already within the domain of morality, then he could not give a
full historical explanation of morality. That something is the first employment of
the capacity for normative guidance (Kitcher's technical-sounding term for rule-
following) to solve a particular practical problem. The problem, which he says
our ancestors shared with chimps and bonobos, was that altruism failures were
common and resulted in serious social costs. Altruism failures are cases where
individuals do not act toward one another as psychological altruists would act:
They do not adjust their behavior toward one another in ways that reflect a
willingness of each to attempt to ensure that the other's desires are satisfied.
The notion of being responsive to the desires of others here is susceptible of
a stronger and weaker interpretation: on the stronger interpretation it means
that each gives equal weight to the desires of all affected in a particular interac-
tion, including his own; on the weaker interpretation a psychological altruist is
someone who gives weight to the desires of all, but not necessarily equal weight.
Surprisingly, Kitcher does not distinguish the stronger and weaker interpreta-
tions, and in consequence it is not altogether clear what counts as an altruism
failure. On the stronger interpretation of what it is to perform as a psychological
altruist, then altruism failures are only avoided when all individuals give equal
weight to the satisfaction of the desires of all.
Unfortunately, Kitcher systematically equivocates in characterizing the start-
ing point of the ethics: Although he begins his account by describing it as (i)
our ancestors' using their capacity for normative guidance to remedy altruism
failures that result in serious social costs (EP, 67; 73; 222; 409),1 when it comes
to explaining how morality developed and what counts as progress in its de-
velopment, he relies instead on the quite different description of it as (ii) our
ancestors' using their capacity for normative guidance to remedy altruism fail-
ures simpliciter. There is a corresponding equivocation in his characterization
of the original function of ethics: Sometimes he says it is to remedy altruism
failures that result in serious costs, sometimes he says it is to remedy altruism
failures. The difference between these characterizations is this: According to
the first, avoiding social costs is the ultimate function, and remedying altruism
failures is a function only so far as it contributes to that; according to the sec-
ond, the ultimate function is to remedy altruism failures, regardless of whether
doing so is the best way to avoid their social costs. That these are two different
functions becomes clear, once we see that in some circumstances, the best way
1 Kitcher variously describes the consequences of altruism failures as social friction, social
friction and violence, and the tearing of the social fabric along with time-consuming and
stressful efforts to mend it. I use the term `social costs' to cover all of these related notions.
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to avoid the social costs of altruism failures may not be to remedy them, but
instead to avoid their social costs in some other way.
The difference between these two characterizations of the original function of
ethics comes out quite clearly in Kitcher's explanation of why the development
of repressive elite rule after a supposed period of primitive egalitarianism was
not a progressive development in morality. He says that such a social arrange-
ment is not even within the bounds of the ethical project because it only treats
the symptoms of altruism failures without remedying the altruism failures them-
selves (EP, 22529; 274). The symptoms are social coststensions and conflicts
and the energy expended in coping with themthat arise from the failures of
altruism. The idea is that a ruler or ruling elite could use the fear of coercion
to avoid the social costs of altruism failures without remedying the altruism
failures themselves by imposing severe penalties on those whose exhibit disrup-
tive behavior when their desires are disregarded. At this point the reader will
understandably ask: If ethical norms first arose as a way of avoiding the social
costs associated with altruism failures, then why say that the original function
of ethics was to remedy altruism failures rather than to reduce social costs?
Kitcher might reply that characterizing the original function as remedying al-
truism failures to reduce their social costs is more informative, given that there
are other sources of social costs and other ways of reducing them. But then a
question remains: How did remedying altruism failures simpliciter, rather than
remedying altruism failures only insofar as doing this most effectively reduces
the social costs to which they give rise become the function of the project of de-
veloping normative guidance? How did the ultimate function of ethics become
remedying altruism failures simpliciter rather than avoiding social costs? Why
would the use of normative guidance to avoid the social costs of altruism fail-
ures without remedying the failures themselvestreating the symptoms rather
than the causesnot also count as part of the ethical project, if the mechanism
employed in both cases was the creation and social embedding of norms? And
why would humans develop a practice of remedying altruism failures simpliciter,
regardless of whether this was the best way or the only way to avoid the costs
of altruism failures?
It is crucial to understand that Kitcher operates with a very demanding
characterization of what it is to remedy an altruism failure: It is for the relevant
individuals to be behaviorally altruistic toward all whose desires or interests are
at stake in an interaction, to act as they would act if they were thorough-going
psychological altruistsagents who appropriately adjust their own desires in
response to the desires of others and in a way that [. . . ] acknowledges the wishes
and aspirations of all members of society (EP, 274). This characterization is
compatible with both the stronger and the weaker interpretation of what it is
to avoid an altruism failure, because acknowledging the wishes and aspiration of
all is compatible with giving them either equal weight or not, but presumably it
does require that everyone's wishes and aspirations be given some weight. It is
because he is operating with this demanding conception of remedying altruism
failures and proceeding on the assumption that the function of the ethical project
is to remedy altruism failures thus understood that he concludes that reducing
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the social costs of altruism failures by instituting repressive elite ruleonly
treating the symptoms of altruism failures, rather than remedying the failures
does not even count as part of the ethical project, much less as a progressive
development within it. For this conclusion about repressive rule to make sense,
the defining function of the ethical project must not be avoiding the social costs
of altruism failures; it must instead be avoiding altruism failures simpliciter.
However, a commitment to avoiding altruism failures simpliciter, where this
means developing a set of norms that `acknowledges the wishes and aspirations
of all' as something pursued for its own sake rather than being pursued only in
so far as this is the best way to avoid serious social costs, looks awfully like a
moral commitment. The worry is that Kitcher is operating with a moralized
understanding of what it is to remedy altruism failures.
The virtue of Kitcher's first characterization of the original function of ethics,
in which the ultimate function is the avoidance of social costs and remedying
altruism failures is only a function so far as it contributes to that, is that it
allows him to start with a non-moral motivation: the simple desire to avoid
social costs. If instead, he begins with the desire to remedy altruism failures
simpliciter, where this means the desire to acknowledge the desires and wishes
of all as something valued for its own sake, rather than merely so far as it reduces
social costs, then the strategy collapses: He is explaining morality by showing
how it arose out of a moral motivation, the motivation to acknowledge the wishes
and aspirations of all as something valued on its own account. What Kitcher
needs to do if the strategy of explaining morality historically by elucidating its
non-moral origins is to succeed, but what he does not do, is to show how an
activity whose original function was to remedy altruism failures only insofar
as this reduced social costs became transformed into one whose function was
to remedy altruism failures simpliciter. He is faced, then, with a dilemma:
Either he must stick with the strategy of explaining how morality could arise
from something nonmoral and then provide an explanation of how the function
of avoiding costs by remedying altruism failures gave rise to the function of
remedying altruism failures simpliciter (regardless of whether this is the best way
to avoid the social costs); or he must abandon his primary aim and acknowledge
that he is not providing an historical explanation of morality, but instead explain
how a richer morality could have developed from a morality whose function was
limited to remedying altruism failures simpliciter, understood in the moralizing
way (rather than remedying them only so far as this fulfilled the function of
reducing the social costs to which they give rise). If he takes the latter path he
must, of course, still explain why humans became preoccupied with remedying
altruism failures simpliciter rather than remedying them when this happened to
be the best way to avoid their costs.
I have suggested that the commitment to remedying altruism failures, where
this means acting so as to acknowledge the wishes and aspirations of all, is
a moral commitment, but my main criticism of Kitcher's account of the rise
of morality does not rely on that being the case. Even if his account does not
violate the stricture of explaining the rise of the moral by reference to something
nonmoral, the central problem remains: He has not explained how reliance on
The Open-ended Normativity of the Ethical 85
norms that function to avoid social costs by remedying altruism failures could
have given rise to norms that function to remedy altruism failures simpliciter.
In section 3, I substantiate my claim that Kitcher does not provide such an
explanation and, in section 4, I will show why his failure to do so undermines his
claim that a genuinely cosmopolitan morality can develop out of the realization
of the original function of the ethical project. For now, I want to explain why
Kitcher shifts from characterizing the function of ethics as remedying altruism
failures that result in serious social costs to characterizing it as remedying al-
truism failures simpliciter. The key to my explanation is a very specific (and
controversial) assumption Kitcher makes about the circumstances in which the
ethical project began.
Kitcher asserts that the ethical project began in a condition of equality, more
specifically, equality of threat advantage (EP, 11). He surmises that norms could
become established only if all the adult members of early human societies as-
sented to them, because the welfare of the group depended on the cooperation of
every adult member.2 By virtue of having the capacity to make credible threats
not to cooperate, each adult member in effect possessed a veto. Accordingly,
in this original condition of equality, the feasible means of using our normative
capacity to reduce the costs of altruism failures were tightly constrained: Only
those norms that acknowledged the wishes and aspirations of all could become
accepted (EP, 274, 295). In other words, in those circumstances, reducing the
social costs of altruism failures and remedying altruism failures simpliciter were
functionally equivalentthe costs of altruism failures could only be avoided by
remedying the altruism failures, not by other means, such as repressing or ig-
noring the desires of some members of the community. In these conditions, the
only way to avoid the costs of altruism failures was to remedy the failures, not
merely treat their symptoms.
The problem for Kitcher is that, as he admits, we are no longer in those cir-
cumstances: The supposed original equality has given way to extreme inequality.
But if that is so, then the question arises: If the original ultimate concern was
to avoid the serious social costs arising from altruism failures (not to remedy
altruism failures simpliciter), why did humans continue to remedy the failures
rather than avoid the costs in other ways (that is, committed to treating the
cause, rather than the symptoms). One answer might be that sometime after
we began developing norms to remedy altruism failures (when that was the only
effective way to avoid their costs, in the circumstance of equality), two things
happened: We found ourselves in inegalitarian circumstances in which the op-
tion of avoiding the costs of altruism failures without remedying the failures
2 Kitcher's egalitarianism assumption is problematic, because he does take seriously the
possibility that equality in early human groups was limited to males. There is, after all,
considerable evidence that in some persisting premodern groups women are relegated to an
inferior position in important ways (for example, as regards control over sexual activity and
access to food). See note 3 below. Quite apart from that, Kitcher is too quick to assume that
all adults (or even all males) could credibly threaten noncooperation. Less powerful or less
skilled members of the group were arguably more dependent on the group for survival than the
group was dependent on them (especially in circumstances where groups were widely scattered
and safe entry into and acceptance by another group was not very probable).
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themselves arose, and we somehow developed a capacity for normative reason-
ing that resulted in our seeing that remedying altruism failures, rather than just
avoiding their costs in other ways, was itself valuable. In other words, we came
to appreciate the value of ways of avoiding the costs of altruism failures that
acknowledged the wishes and aspirations of all members of society as such, not
just because and when this was the only effective way to avoid social costs.
One can at least begin to imagine how this change might have occurred, if one
acknowledges what might be called the open-ended normativity of the ethical.
The idea would be that human beings have the capacity to reflect on the norms
they follow and to reason about them in ways that lead them to acknowledge new
normsincluding norms that that express a commitment to the value of each
individual human being (or at least each member of one's society), irrespective
of their threat capacity or other strategic properties. This way of proceeding,
however, runs directly contrary to a major thesis of Kitcher's book, namely,
that the original function of ethics remains its primary function (EP, 8). For as
I have argued, the original function of ethics, according to what Kitcher should
say if he wishes to explain the moral in terms of non-moral origins, is to remedy
altruism failures so far as they have serious social costs, not to remedy altruism
failures simpliciter.
Appealing to the development of our capacity for normative reasoning is not
the only way one might explain why the ethical project is directed toward reme-
dying altruism failures simpliciter, long after the demise of the equality of threat
capacity that made this the only effective way of avoiding the social costs of al-
truism failures. One might instead propose a cultural-selectionist argument to
show why, even in circumstances of inequality, societies that developed norms
that remedied altruism failures in Kitcher's moralized sense, by acknowledging
the wishes and aspirations of all, rather than avoiding their costs in other ways,
were favored. In other words, one might argue that suppression of what might
be called legitimate desires tends to have results that are counterproductive, in
terms of the features of societies that are the targets of cultural selection. Un-
fortunately, Kitcher does not supply either type of explanation. He does not
explain how human societies developed norms and practices for remedying al-
truism failures simpliciter rather than for remedying them only in circumstances
in which that is the best way of reducing the social costs they produce. He does
not explain how, in the conditions of inequality that he admits have obtained for
thousands of years, social norms would arise and become embedded whose ulti-
mate function is to reduce the social costs of altruism failures by acknowledging
the wishes and aspirations of all.
My surmise is that Kitcher does not provide such an explanation because he
does not sufficiently appreciate the implications of his original equality assump-
tion. On his own account, it is a constraint that focuses the ethical project on
remedying altruism failures rather than treating their symptoms, but once the
constraint is lifted, he gives us no reason to think that the focus on remedies
would remain. To put the same point differently, Kitcher does not explain why
the function of the ethical project under the peculiar and fleeting contingency
of equal threat capacity would persist as its function under quite different cir-
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cumstances. To be true to the aim of giving a full historical explanation of
morality, on that begins with something nonmoral, Kitcher should unequivo-
cally say that the ethical project began as humans harnessed their capacity for
normative guidance to the task of avoiding serious social costs, including and
perhaps even primarily those costs that result from altruism failures. But that
way of proceeding would not lead, without more argument than he provides,
to the conclusion that the primary function of the ethical project today and
through all of its history after the initial period of equality is to remedy altruism
failures.
My assessment of Kitcher's execution of his first aimto provide an explana-
tion of the origin and subsequent development of moralitycan now be briefly
summarized. He has not given a historical explanation of morality that starts
with something nonmoral. If he sticks with the notion that the original function
of the ethical project happened to be to remedy altruism failures because, due
to the contingent and temporary fact that threat capacity was equal, the only
way to avoid the social costs of altruism failures was to remedy the failures,
then he must then admit that he has not explained why remedying altruism
failures (rather than remedying them only when this is the only or the best
way to avoid the associated social costs) is the primary function of ethics in the
present (or any function at all, for that matter). This first alternative enables
him to honor his commitment to providing a nonmoral starting point for his
explanation of morality, but undercuts his ability to provide the explanation.
Alternatively, if he admits that the function with which his account begins is
that of remedying altruism failures simpliciterunderstood in a moralized way
as acknowledging the wishes and aspirations of all (rather than doing so simply
because equality of threat capacity makes this the only way to avoid the costs of
altruism failures)then he must abandon his claim to have given a full expla-
nation of morality, because he will have explained morality in terms of a moral
commitmentand one whose existence remains utterly mysterious on his view.
Before turning to his account of moral progress, I want to note that my
criticism so far has granted Kitcher the assumption that the ethical project orig-
inated in circumstances of equality. That assumption is much more problematic
than Kitcher acknowledges. Kitcher, like many others, bases his characterization
of early human societies on evidence about contemporary premodern societies
(along with speculations about similarities between early humans and chimps).
However, there is considerable evidence that not a few contemporary premod-
ern societies exhibit considerable inequality between men and women.3 If early
societies exhibited similar gender inequality, then Kitcher will have given us no
good reason to conclude that the solution to the problem of social costs resulting
from altruism failures was as tightly constrained as he says: We cannot assume
that the norms that developed to solve this problem had to acknowledge the
wishes and aspirations of all members of society. Quite apart from the fact that
3 For a small sample of the large literature documenting gender inequality in pre-modern so-
cieties, see the following: Edgerton 1992, 74105; Herdt 1998, 347350. Kim Sterelny provides
an evolutionary explanation of how practices of extreme inequality could arise and become
stable: Sterelny 2007.
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Kitcher's generalization about the egalitarian character of early human societies
seems to have overlooked the evidence of gender inequality, there is another
problem: Some members of societyfor example, especially ferocious warriors
or exceptionally successful huntersmay have been regarded as sufficiently more
valuable to the group that the threat of their non-cooperating weighed more
heavily. On Kitcher's view, this would mean that they could exert more influ-
ence on the character of the norms that became accepted, presumably in ways
that gave more weight to their interests. If this occurred, then the norms might
not acknowledge the wishes and aspirations of all members of the group, or at
least would not give them anything like equal weight. If, as Kitcher says, the
ethical project only began when humans harnessed their capacity for norma-
tive guidance to remedy altruism failures in the sense of developing responses
to conflicts of interest that acknowledged the wishes and aspirations of all, then
it is hard to see how it would ever get off the ground if there was either gender
inequality or significant inequality as to how the cooperation of different individ-
uals affected group welfare. Having said that, I wish to emphasize that my first
criticism of Kitcher shows that his primary explanatory aim is not achievable,
even if we grant him the assumption that early human societies were egalitarian.
3. The Account of Moral Progress
There are two main difficulties with Kitcher's treatment of moral progress. The
first is that he does not explain how what he takes to be progressive changes
developed out of the supposedly original function of remedying altruism failures,
even if we grant his characterization of what it is to remedy an altruism failure
(as involving norms that acknowledge the wishes and aspirations of all members
of society). The second is that he not only omits consideration of what may
be one of the most momentous developments in our understanding of morality,
but also appears to be barred from making sense of it by his account of the
egalitarian circumstances in which the ethical project began.
Kitcher lists several progressive developments in the ethical project: the abo-
lition of chattel slavery, the recognition of the equal rights of women, the transi-
tion from viewing same sex preferences and behavior as vicious to viewing them
as on a par with heterosexual preferences and behavior and subject to the same
criteria of moral appraisal, and the emergence of punishment practices that re-
flect a clearer recognition of individual responsibility. Yet in none of these cases
does he provide an account of how these transitions could have occurred that
actually makes use of the idea that the original function of the ethical project
was to remedy altruism failures. The closest he comes is in the case of the recog-
nition of women's equal rights. There he notes that an important first step was
to convince large numbers of the public that womennormal womenactually
desired a much broader range of opportunities. There is some connection here to
Kitcher's moralized notion of remedying altruism failures, because this first step
involved coming to acknowledge some `wishes and aspirations' that had before
been overlooked. But that is a far cry from providing an explanation of how the
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original function of remedying altruism failures could have developed in such a
way as to produce the progressive development of the recognition of women's
equal rights. For one thing, we are given no clue as to how the discharging of
the original function could have led to socially-embedded ways of determining
priorities among the wishes and aspirations of different groups in cases in which
they are in conflict, in this instance women, on the one hand, and traditional
men, on the other. The answer cannot be that discharging the original function
could only be achieved by a resolution of this conflict of interest that was fair,
because the solution had to be acceptable to all. That answer might suffice
in the original condition of equality, because norms could not become socially
embedded there unless they were acceptable to all. But the circumstances in
which the equal rights of women were first asserted were circumstances of gross
inequality.
The difficulty here is the yawning gap between the notion of remedying altru-
ism failureseven in its moralized formand the complexities of moral reason-
ing about conflicts of interests. In fact, it is not much of an exaggeration to say
that any serious consideration of moral reasoning and its role in moral progress
is conspicuously absent in The Ethical Project. Instead, Kitcher remains content
to emphasize that new ethical practices do not come about through moments of
insight prompted in the way in which scientific progress occurs and to appeal to
the idea that new desires become `acknowledged'.
It is hard to see how Kitcher's characterization of the function of ethics could
explain moral progress. There is an indefinitely large range of possible norms
all of which acknowledge the wishes and aspirations of all in society, ranging
from those that give equal weight to the desires or interests of all to extremely
inegalitarian ones. All of these norms fulfill the function of remedying altruism
failures on KItcher's understanding of what counts as a remedy. But what
that shows is that the hypothesis that the original and still primary function
of morality is to remedy altruism failures tells us very little about morality or
moral progress. What we need, but do not get from Kitcher, is an account of how
humans developed better ways of adjudicating recurring conflicts of interests, not
just by creating and implementing norms, but also by learning to reason about
norms in ways that allow them to see that some ways of responding to conflicts
of interests are preferable to others.
Of course, the assumption that progressive transitions had much to do with
the development of moral reasoning can be challenged. On some accounts, it is
shifts in power that matter and moral reasoning is only ad hoc window-dressing.
Kitcher does not avail himself of that sort of approach, however, and to do so
would be at odds with his emphasis on the ethical project's reliance on norms.
Nor does he provide a mixed account that delineates the interaction of power as it
is ordinarily understood and the power of normative reasoning. In the other cases
of moral progress Kitcher discusses, the problem is if anything worse: His view
about the original (and still supposedly primary) function of ethics simply does
not explain how these transitions came about. At most we get vague references
to how the pursuit of the original function gave rise to new desires and new
ways of remedying the altruism failures that they occasioned. In sum, Kitcher's
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discussions of instances of moral progress, while perceptive and interesting, float
free from his explanatory model.
Moreover, it is puzzling that Kitcher does not even attempt to explain one
other transition that many of us believe was highly progressive: the abandon-
ment (by some of us at least) of the idea that the ultimate sanction of morality
is an unseen enforcer, God or providence or the mandate of heaven, etc. He
explains how belief in an unseen enforcer provided a powerful boost to the social
sanctions attached to norms that helped remedy altruism failures, but offers no
explanation of how new attempts to remedy altruism failures could lead to the
abandonment of the idea of an unseen enforcer.
Presumably, the explanation of how at least some people have come to aban-
don the notion that there is an unseen enforcer of morality would have to refer to
developments beyond the boundaries of the ethical project as Kitcher conceives
it: the rise of modern science and with it the availability of naturalistic expla-
nations for phenomena that were previously thought to be explainable only by
supernatural causes; the loss of the Catholic church's monopoly on Christian-
ity in the West and the subsequent proliferation of religious views, including
Protestant varieties that gave more credit to the individual's own judgment as
to how to live, the rise of new norms of behavior centered on the market and in
some cases in direct opposition to religious teachings, and so on. Kitcher does
not explicitly say that the development of the ethical project can understood
without reference to forces exogenous to it, but he proceeds as if that were the
case.4 It is highly controversial, however, to assume that the development of
ethics is self-sufficient in this way.
A related progressive developmentand one that J. B. Schneewind charac-
terizes as a revolution rather than a reformis the idea that morality is about
happiness, not about what is forbidden or required by tradition or according
to some sacred text (Schneewind 1996). Schneewind identifies Bentham as the
figure who crystallized this revolutionary idea. Kitcher is silent on how his un-
derstanding of the ethical project illuminates this progressive transition as well.
4 Perhaps Kitcher does not think he needs to explain the rejection of the idea of an unseen
enforcer, because he does not view it as an instance of moral progress. His conception of moral
progress is functional: Developments are progressive insofar as they enable human ethical
practices better to perform the function of remedying altruism failures (and the new functions
to which this gives rise). The falsity of the belief in an unforeseen enforcer is irrelevant
to its functional efficacy. On this view, it is not clear how the rejection of the belief in
an unseen enforcer or of the belief that what is moral depends on what God wills could be
understood to be progressive. For after all, it might turn out that in this case false belief is more
functionally efficacious than true belief. At this point, one may wonder whether something
has gone seriously wrong in Kitcher's account of moral progress. A purely functional account
of progresswhere the function is remedying altruism failures, irrespective of whether the
means of doing so involves radically false understandings of what ethics itself is aboutseems
inadequate. One would think that an ethical practice that is not grounded in that sort of
falsehood is more progressive, other things being equal, than one that is. To put the same
point differently, if one sticks to his purely functional conception of progress, an ethical practice
that included the participants' acceptance of Kitcher's naturalistic account of how ethics arose
and developed would not be more progressive than one founded on the false belief that moral
rules are God's commands.
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A much more serious omission in Kitcher's discussion of moral progress is
the repudiation of what I have called morality as self-interested reciprocity, a
view about morality that appears in various guises in Epicurus and Hobbes,
that is suggested by a famous passage in Hume, and that achieves its clearest
and most systematic articulation in the work of David Gauthier.5 According
to morality as self-interested reciprocity, individuals have moral standing only
by virtue of their strategic propertiestheir capacity to contribute positively to
the welfare of others or to pose a threat to it. The general theme here is that
morality is a kind of bargain among those who can affect each other's welfare,
whether positively or negatively. It is fair to say that what many regard as one
of the most progressive developments in moralitythe `social-embedding' (to
use Kitcher's phrase) of the idea of human rights in domestic and international
lawis a direct repudiation of morality as self-interested reciprocity. For after
all, the core idea of human rights is generally understood to be that there are
some rightsincluding very basic rights that give content to the idea of equal
moral standingthat all human beings possess, not because of their strategic
properties (their capacity to threaten or contribute to the well-being of others),
but simply by virtue of their humanity. Historians of the modern human rights
movement have marshaled impressive evidence to show that the salience of this
idea and the effort to institutionalize it through international law were direct
responses to the horrors wrought during World War II in the name of a fascist
ideology that rejected the moral equality of all human individuals and asserted
that the individual has worth only insofar as she contributes to the flourishing
of the state or the nation.6 The Nazi's treatment of those they characterized
as `useless eaters' is the ultimate practical expression of the idea of morality as
self-interested reciprocity.
Kitcher's omission of any discussion of the rejection of morality as self-
interested reciprocity as an instance of moral progress may not be a matter
of chance. Consider, again, his view that our ancestors created and socially-
embedded norms to remedy altruism failures (rather than to avoid their costs
in other ways) at the beginning of the ethical project because, in the then pre-
vailing circumstances of equality of threat capacity, this was the only way or at
least the best way to avoid the social costs of altruism failures. I have argued
that Kitcher has not provided an account of how the ethical project could have
transitioned from a situation in which the contingency of equal threat capacity
ensured that the emerging norms would avoid social costs by remedying altru-
ism failures (acknowledging the wishes and aspirations of all members of the
group) rather than in some less morally wholesome way. The same point can
now be rephrased: How, on Kitcher's view, could a project for normative guid-
ance rooted in equal threat capacity have developed a coherent discourse that
directly repudiates the idea that moral standing depends on threat capacity or
any other strategic property? The answer, presumably, is that large numbers of
5 Buchanan 1990, 227252. My main topic in this article is different conceptions of justice,
but I also distinguish the more general view about the whole of morality.
6 The best single-volume case for this claim about the historical origins of the modern
human rights movement is Morsink 1999, especially the first two chapters.
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human beings eventually came to develop new views about what confers moral
standing and what does not. Nothing in Kitcher's description of the original
function of ethics or his highly general remarks about the original function giv-
ing rise to new functions and engendering new desires tells us what we need to
know to understand how this change could have come about. His answer cannot
be that norms that achieve genuine remedies for altruism failures must repudi-
ate morality as self-interested reciprocity because only such norms will take the
wishes and aspirations of all seriously. The question, as I have already noted,
is why, once the contingent constraint of equality of threat capacity no longer
applies, we should expect moral norms to be fundamentally egalitarian, that is,
to exclude strategic criteria for basic moral standing, such as threat capacity.
Perhaps Kitcher's omission of the modern human rights movement in his list
of progressive developments stems from his failure to recognize the enormous gap
between the sort of morality that was likely to develop in his original condition of
equal threat capacity and the sort of morality that we now have. I suspect that
this gap can only be bridged by an account that takes moral reasoningand
what might be called the open-ended normativity of the ethicalmuch more
seriously than Kitcher does and, that when the story about moral reasoning
is filled out, the idea that the present primary function of ethics is to remedy
altruism failures will look quite implausible. For one thing, much of our moral
reasoning proceeds on the basis of background assumptions about moral status.
Questions about who has basic moral status are prior to questions about how to
satisfy conflicting desires, because moral status determines whose desires even
count.
4. Kitcher's Positive Proposal: A Genuinely
Cosmopolitan Morality
According to Kitcher, the ethical project began as an exclusively intra-group
activityan attempt to remedy altruism failures among the members of a par-
ticular society that resulted in serious social costs to the members of that society.
Near the end of his book, he identifies a high priority for the continuation of
the ethical project: the development of a genuinely cosmopolitan morality that
takes seriously the interests of all human beings, including perhaps especially
the world's most desperately poor people (EP, 311312, 37484). Kitcher not
only proposes much more globally egalitarian social norms and practices but also
contends that in some sense this new progressive development can be seen as a
natural continuation of the original ethical project.
That is a remarkable contention, given the vast distance between an ethical
project geared toward remedying altruism failures in circumstances of equal-
ity among members of small, face-to-face groups and a genuinely cosmopolitan
morality. How does Kitcher propose to traverse this distance? He tries to do so
by pointing out that very early in the ethical project, when humans still lived
in small groups, they developed trading relations with other small groups. Soci-
eties that did this well had to develop norms that `acknowledged the wishes and
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aspirations' of out-group members. To the extent that good trading relations
contributed to the well-being of groups, such norms took hold and proliferated.
So far, so good; we can now see how the moral universe could be extended
beyond the small group.
But notice that on Kitcher's account, this extension can only occur to the
degree that the members of different groups can benefit each other (through
trade). In other words, the ethical project is still limited to conferring moral
standing on individuals by virtue of their strategic capacities, in this case, the
capacity to contribute to the welfare of the members of other groups through
trading with them. To the extent that he does anything to explain how a gen-
uinely cosmopolitan morality could emerge from the humble origins of the ethical
project, Kitcher suggests that the world's most auent people must treat the
worst-off in a much more egalitarian fashion because any alternative will involve
unacceptable social costs. Thus he says that [p]ragmatic naturalism [his nor-
mative stance] views us as facing a scaled-up version of the predicament of the
original ethicists. The primary challenge stems from the need to address the
sources of conflict [including] the pronounced inequalities of the contemporary
world [. . . ]. (EP, 311)
Note that his claim must be that to persist with our present grossly inegal-
itarian global order will result in unacceptable social costs to the auent. In
other words, if Kitcher is sticking to the characterization of the original function
of the ethical project that I have argued he must employ if he is to provide an
explanation of morality that begins with something nonmoral, he must be ad-
vancing the implausible claim that it is in the non-moral interest of the best off
to undertake a radical divestiture of their wealth and power. He overlooks the
fact that the best-off have shown remarkable skill in creating and sustaining a
global order that does an excellent job of insulating themselves from the costs of
inequality. They seem to be quite adept at avoiding the costs (to themselves) of
their altruism failures, without remedying them. And, as I have argued, Kitcher
has not shown why, as modern-day participants in the ethical project whose
origins he claims to have illuminated, they should be concerned with remedying
their altruism failures, rather than simply avoiding their costs.
The problem is that the resources of Kitcher's account of morality are not
adequate to explain either the rationality or the likelihood of the emergence of a
genuinely cosmopolitan morality. No appeal to equality of threat capacity or any
other strategic property can demonstrate the rationality of global egalitarianism
or explain why we should expect it to emerge from the ethical project as Kitcher
has characterized it. If a much more egalitarian global order developsand
it is doubtful that it willit is more likely to emerge from the growth of a
way of thinking about morality that severs the conferral of moral standing from
the possession of strategic capacities, something like the modern conception of
human rights. But the development of that moral conception and its impressive
though still inadequate `social embedding' must remain mysterious on Kitcher's
account of the ethical project.
If my arguments are sound, some of the central theses of The Ethical Project
require, at the very least, substantial modification, and its explanation of the
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development of morality from its first appearance until the present will require
much elaboration. Whether or not Kitcher agrees and takes up these tasks, he
has written a book that everyone who thinks seriously about morality will have
to take into account.
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